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A Wobbly Bridge: Strategic Interests 
and Objectives in Force 2030
Hugh White 
Clear definition of enduring strategic interests and objectives is fundamental to setting clear 
capability priorities, which is the key purpose of a Defence White Paper.  Force 2030 recognises 
this, and offers the outline of a rigorous hierarchy of interests and objectives, modelled on the 
approach developed in Defence 2000.  But the details raise perplexing questions about the 
nature of Australia’s strategic engagement in our immediate neighbourhood, our strategic 
relationship with Indonesia, our role in Northeast Asia, and about which objectives really drive 
our force priorities.  These failings seriously undermine the new White Paper’s policy argument. 
Most Defence White Papers start with an essay on the future strategic 
environment and end with a shopping list of capabilities.  The test of a 
successful white paper is what comes in between.  There needs to be a 
bridge between the essay and the shopping list—an argument to establish 
that the capabilities on the shopping list really provide the most cost-effective 
way to mange the risks inherent in the strategic environment that the essay 
has described.1  The Rudd Government’s new Defence White Paper, Force
2030, has taken this part of its task seriously.  It goes to some trouble to 
build a policy argument linking strategic risks with capability priorities. 
Like the last White Paper, Defence 2000, Force 2030 begins with an 
expansive concept of strategic risk.  It affirms that the ultimate rationale of 
defence policy is to secure the country itself from direct attack,2 but pays 
careful attention to a broader range of strategic risks which goes beyond 
direct threats to the continent, and includes international developments 
which would make such direct threats more probable or more serious.  The 
argument it builds to connect these strategic risks to capability priorities 
draws heavily on a set of ideas developed in the 1990’s and applied in 
Defence 2000.  At the core of that approach are concepts of strategic 
interests and strategic objectives, which establish the connection between 
strategic risks and capability priorities.3  The success of Force 2030’s policy 
1 For a fuller account of the purposes of Defence White Papers in general, and of the 2009 
White Paper in particular, see Hugh White, The new Defence White Paper: why we need it and 
what it needs to do (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008).  
2 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), para. 5.4. 
3 For a fuller description of the concepts of strategic interest sketched here and its place in 
recent Australian defence planning, see Hugh White, ‘Strategic Interests in Australian 
Defence Policy: Some Historical and Methodological Reflections’, Security Challenges, vol. 4, 
no. 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 63-79.  
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argument therefore depends crucially on how well strategic interests and 
objectives are identified and defined.  That is the focus of this article.     
‘Strategic interests’, in the words of Force 2030,
are those national security interests that concern the structure and features 
of the international order that ensure our security from armed attack—and in 
relation to which Australia might contemplate the use of force.4
As Force 2030 goes on to point out, this is narrower than the concept of 
‘national security’ interests,5 and so it should be: the aim here is to capture 
that set of wider interests which should drive decisions about the kind of 
defence force we need to build, which is properly much narrower than the 
wider concepts of national interests which inform other policy choices.   
Strategic interests conceived in this way provide the basis for determining 
capability priorities because they provide the basis for deciding strategic 
objectives, which are the things we want to be able to do with armed force to 
protect those interests.  These then provide the basis for identifying the kinds 
of operations that could most cost-effectively attain those strategic 
objectives, which in turn provide the basis for identifying the capabilities that 
could most cost-effectively perform those operations.  To make this process 
work, the way we identify and describe strategic interests must meet some 
tough tests.  The strategic interests we identify must be genuinely enduring, 
because the decisions which will be based on them have thirty- or forty-year 
timeframes.  They must be defined clearly and specifically enough to inform 
the subsequent decisions about objectives, operational options and 
capability priorities.  And they need to be compellingly prioritised to support 
the inevitable process of selection required to balance cost and risk. 
To understand Force 2030’s account of Australian strategic interests, it is 
helpful to look back at the development of the ideas which it seeks to apply.  
Those ideas emerged in the 1990s, when it became clear to defence 
policymakers that the narrow concept of Australia’s strategic risks and 
interests developed in the 1970s and 1980s would need to be broadened in 
response to the end of the Cold War and the rise of China.  For several 
decades after Vietnam, it had seemed most unlikely that Australia would 
wish or need to use force except to defend the continent against direct 
attack.  But over the 1990s it became clearer that both the chronic instability 
of Australia’s nearer neighbours and longer-term uncertainties about Asia’s 
order required a wider view of Australian strategic interests and objectives.  
Building on a first attempt in 1997,6 the Defence 2000 White Paper 
developed such a view.  It set out what has become known as the 
4 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 5.2. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
1997).
A Wobbly Bridge: Strategic Interests and Objectives in Force 2030
Volume 5, Number 1 (Winter 2009) - 23 - 
‘concentric circles’ model—a hierarchy of five interests and associated 
objectives, prioritised geographically from the defence of the continent at the 
centre to support for a stable global system at the periphery.7  This construct 
was challenged after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001: Robert Hill, then 
Defence Minister, said in July 2002 that he was unsure that it had ever made 
sense to define Australia’s strategic interests in terms of a series of 
concentric circles.8  However, the Howard Government maintained the 
Defence 2000 construct,9 even if some capability decisions in 2003 
honoured it more in the breach than the observance. 
Force 2030 too maintains the ‘concentric circles’ model of Defence 2000,
but there are important differences in the way the model is applied.  Some of 
these differences have significant policy implications, which are generally not 
explored or explained, so it is often hard to know exactly why they have been 
made.  Moreover, Force 2030 is not a precisely-drafted document, and many 
key issues are addressed in different—sometimes contradictory—ways in 
different passages.  In particular, there is a lot of imprecision about how the 
interests defined in Chapter 5 relate to the policy precepts enunciated in 
Chapter 6, and the objectives (called ‘tasks’ in Force 2030)10 defined in 
Chapter 7.  That makes it harder to know how far differences in the 
treatment of strategic interests and objectives between this White Paper and 
the last one reflect substantive policy shifts, quirks of expression or even 
simple muddles.  Also, while Force 2030 draws heavily on Defence 2000, it 
reaches back further to echo some ideas from the 1987 White Paper, The 
Defence of Australia,11 as well.  Some of the idiosyncrasies of Force 2030
can be traced to the problems of melding elements of these two rather 
different policy constructs into a single argument.  
The following sections will explore some of these issues under the four 
headings describing Australia’s strategic interests in Chapter 5 of Force 
2030.
7 Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2000), Chapter 4.  
8 Robert Hill, ‘Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence’, Address to the 
Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australian Defence College, Canberra, 18 June 2002, 
<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2002/180602.doc> [Accessed 1 July 2009]. 
9 See for example: Department of Defence, Defence Update 2007 (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2007). 
10 Unfortunately the drafters of Force 2030 have followed their predecessors in Defence 2000 by 
using the word ‘tasks’ to cover what should be called ‘strategic objectives’.  ‘Objective’ is more 
appropriate in the contexts that concern us here, whereas ‘task’ should be reserved for the 
operational level.
11 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
1987).
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A Secure Australia 
In Chapter 5, under the heading of “A Secure Australia”, Force 2030
describes “the defence of Australia against direct armed attack” as “our most 
basic strategic interest”.12  In Chapter 6 this judgement translates into a 
decision that  
Australia’s defence policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance 
in the direct defence of Australia and in relation to our unique strategic 
interests…13
In Chapter 7 this principle then translates into the identification of “Deterring 
and Defeating Attacks on Australia” as “the principal task” for the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF).14
This affirmation that the direct defence of the continent is Australia’s most 
important strategic interest is sound and significant, especially in view of the 
contrary views expressed from time to time in the defence debates of the 
past few years.15  But there are real uncertainties about what that implies for 
the way capability priorities are defined, in three respects.  First, there is a 
question of scope.  When this idea appears in Chapter 6, in the sentence 
quoted above, a new concept is added to the defence of Australia: “our 
unique strategic interests”.  Force 2030 does not define what our unique 
interests are.  The context clearly suggests they go beyond the direct 
defence of the continent, most obviously to include denial of bases to a 
potential adversary in the immediate neighbourhood.16  But other passages 
seem to suggest that the defence of the immediate neighbourhood, though 
important, is a lower priority than the defence of the continent itself.  So does 
the direct defence of the continent alone take highest priority in force 
planning, or does it include defence of the immediate neighbourhood as 
well?  These are critical uncertainties—especially in the light of how 
Australia’s interests are defined in relation to the immediate neighbourhood. 
Second, and more broadly, Force 2030 is ambiguous about the extent to 
which this highest-priority interest (however defined) and its associated 
objective alone determine force priorities, or whether other, lower-priority, 
interests and objectives also shape decisions, albeit with less weight.  This is 
a question on which Defence 2000 was also not as clear as it should have 
been.  Its policy argument clearly implied that all interests and objectives 
shaped force planning, in accordance with their relative weight, but it 
12 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para 5.4. 
13 Ibid., para. 6.16. 
14 Ibid., para 7.2. 
15 See for example Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture 
and Way of War 1901-2005, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper, no. 306 (Canberra: 
Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005).  
16 This is suggested for example in Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 6.19—although 
an evident misprint makes this passage especially hard to follow.    
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retained some passages that still echoed the 1987 Defence of Australia 
White Paper in assigning sole priority to the defence of the continent itself.  
Force 2030 perpetuates and even amplifies this muddle.  In many passages 
it seems to revert back to the idea that only the defence of the continent 
should count in shaping force priorities,17 in others it acknowledges the need 
to take wider view.18  Overall the impression left with this reader at least is 
that on this critical issue, Force 2030 goes backwards, being closer in spirit 
to the 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper than to Defence 2000.19
Third, there is a major and highly consequential confusion about whether 
Australia’s strategic objective should be to defend the continent 
independently against the forces of a major Asian power, or only against the 
kinds of forces that Indonesia could bring to bear against us.  This point is 
touched on in other articles in this edition, so I will not address it further here.  
Suffice to say that settling such questions is critical to the transition from 
identifying an interest to setting an objective.  Until we are clear what we aim 
to be able to do by ourselves, and against whom, force planning will remain 
a muddle.
A Secure Immediate Neighbourhood  
The second strategic interest identified in Force 2030 is “a secure immediate 
neighbourhood”.20  This is very similar to the second interest identified in 
Defence 2000, but nonetheless raises some important questions.  The first 
relates to internal security.  Like Defence 2000,21 Force 2030 identifies
internal stability as a strategic interest not only in the small island states, but 
also in Indonesia.  This was clearly an error in 2000.  While it was credible 
for Australia to contemplate the use of armed force to support internal 
stability in countries like East Timor and even Papua New Guinea, it was not 
credible in a country the size of Indonesia.  Conflating our interests in 
Indonesia with those in the small neighbours obscures this critical difference.  
Force 2030 goes even deeper into this error than Defence 2000, making the 
rather remarkable statement that “It is in Australia’s vital strategic interests to 
see a stable and cohesive Indonesia”.22  Taken in the context of the 
definition of ‘strategic interest’ provided in Force 2030, the direct implication 
of this statement is that Australia would contemplate the use of force to 
support internal stability in Indonesia.  This seems an unsustainable 
17 For example, Ibid., para. 6.29.   
18 Ibid., para. 8.9-8.14. 
19 For arguments as to why this is the wrong direction to go, see Hugh White, Beyond the 
Defence of Australia: finding a new balance in Australia’s defence policy (Sydney: Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, 2006); and ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on 
Australian Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher 
(eds.), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy
(Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), pp. 163-187. 
20 Department of Defence, Force 2030, p. 42. 
21 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, para. 4.8-4.9.  
22 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 5.10. 
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proposition under almost any circumstances.  Certainly the White Paper fails 
to follow through with proposals for forces that could make it credible.  And—
a separate question, but still significant—how must the Indonesians take it? 
Another problem with treating Indonesia under the same heading as our 
small neighbours is the difference in our response should they come under 
external attack.  In the immediate neighbourhood—excluding Indonesia—
Australia has a strategic interest in being able to exclude potentially hostile 
powers, including major Asian powers, alone if necessary.23  In maritime 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Australia’s strategic objectives are 
arguably more limited—to being able to provide substantial support to local 
coalition partners, and perhaps to leading such a coalition.     
Force 2030 provides no such clear-cut distinction, which leaves quite 
ambiguous what exactly Australia’s strategic objectives should be in such a 
situation, and thus what the ADF needs to be able to do.  This problem is 
confounded by the fact that in defining strategic objectives for the ADF in 
Chapter 7, Force 2030 omits to mention the denial of access to bases 
among our small neighbours to potentially-hostile powers.24  This may be 
simply an oversight, because denial is central to the definition of strategic 
interests in the immediate neighbourhood,25 and is clearly referred to 
elsewhere as a priority.  But the failure to translate this central interest into a 
clear objective is nonetheless perplexing—and surely wrong as a point of 
policy.  Moreover, in omitting denial of the immediate neighbourhood as a 
strategic objective, Force 2030 also drops one of the most important policy 
innovations of Defence 2000: a strongly-worded unilateral undertaking by 
Australia to help defend any of our small island neighbours facing 
conventional military attack.26  It is hard to know whether this omission was 
deliberate or an oversight: arguably it was a mistake either way. 
The way to resolve this problem is to treat our strategic interests in Indonesia 
under a separate heading from the small states of our immediate 
neighbourhood.  In the small states of the immediate neighbourhood, 
Australia has a strategic interest in internal stability, and a virtually automatic 
commitment to support them alone if necessary from attack by a major 
power.  In regards to Indonesia, while internal stability is clearly very 
important to us, it is not a strategic interest, and the level of support we might 
provide if it faced external attack, while still substantial, is more conditional. 
Finally, Force 2030 introduces a new element in Australia’s strategic 
interests in relation to Indonesia.  In the section headed “A Secure 
Immediate Neighbourhood” it says that 
23 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, para. 6.11-6.13, which pointedly do not include the 
limitation in relation to wider interests contained in para 6.20. 
24 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 7.10-7.12. 
25 Ibid., para. 5.7. 
26 Department of Defence, Defence 2000, para. 5.51 and 5.54.  
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Australia has an enduring strategic interest in preventing or mitigating any 
attempt by nearby states to develop the capacity to undertake sustained 
military operations within our approaches.27
It is not clear that this is either true, or that it is a credible basis for Australian 
policy.  Clearly Australia has, as Force 2030 says under the first interest (“A 
Secure Australia”), “a fundamental interest in controlling the air and sea 
approaches to our continent”.28  But this is not the same as saying that we 
have an enduring interest in preventing Indonesia from acquiring the kinds of 
capabilities that could operate in those approaches.  Such capabilities would 
after all be the very ones that could also operate in Indonesia’s Northern 
approaches, and help protect both Indonesia and Australia from the major-
power intrusions that it is in our enduring interests to prevent.  Framing 
Australia’s interest in this way therefore overlooks the inescapable and 
deeply significant ambivalence that permeates all aspects of the Australia-
Indonesia strategic nexus.  Depending on the circumstances, Indonesia 
could be either a major threat, or an immense strategic asset.  At some time 
in the future, an alliance with a strong Indonesia might be the key to our 
security, and Force 2030 itself says that “assisting our Southeast Asian 
partners to meet external challenges”29 is one priority task for the ADF.  This 
means we can never simply say that Indonesian military weakness is an 
enduring Australian interest.  Moreover, it is hard to see how a policy based 
on this interest could work.  What would we do to “prevent” Indonesia from 
acquiring military capabilities that would be perfectly legitimate to seek for its 
own security?  And what implications would such a policy have for our 
bilateral relationship with Jakarta, and for the prospect of close strategic 
cooperation which Force 2030 itself advocates?30                
Strategic Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region   
Force 2030 differs from Defence 2000 in lumping Australia’s strategic 
interests in Asia beyond Indonesia under a single heading, thus cutting the 
number of ‘concentric circles’ in Australia’s hierarchy of interests and 
objectives from five to four.31   Defence 2000 separated Australian interests 
in maritime Southeast Asia from those further afield in Asia, on the grounds 
that closer to home our interests are stronger and the corresponding 
objectives more demanding.  In particular, it judged that Australia might 
contemplate supporting a coalition in maritime Southeast Asia to resist 
external aggression even if the United States did not, whereas we would not 
contemplate joining coalitions in major conflicts elsewhere in Asia other than 
in support of the United States.32 Force 2030 looses this important 
27 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 5.8. 
28 Ibid., para. 5.5. 
29 Ibid., para. 7.13. 
30 Ibid., para. 11.21. 
31 Ibid., para. 5.7-5.16. 
32 Department of Defence Defence 2000, para. 6.21. 
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distinction.  It is not clear why this has been done, but it is striking that in 
doing so it revives something of the spirit of the 1987 Defence of Australia 
White Paper,33 which made a sharp binary distinction between interests 
within an “Area of Primary Strategic Interest”, and those outside it.  We can 
see a resemblance between the “immediate neighbourhood” as defined in 
paragraph 5.7 of Force 2030 and the “Area of Primary Strategic Interest” that 
featured prominently in 1987.  The same idea reappears in another guise in 
Chapter 6 of Force 2030, where a region stretching from the equator to 
Antarctica and from the Eastern Indian Ocean to Polynesia is defined as the 
ADF’s “Primary Operational Environment”.34  It is possible that here again we 
see the hold that the 1987 White Paper seems to have exerted over the 
drafters of Force 2030.
Finally under this heading we should note the clear suggestion, reflecting 
views expressed by the Prime Minister in 2008,35 that our strategic interests 
and objectives in Asia include the protection of shipping lanes against attack 
by major Asian powers.36  This is a very significant proposition, because the 
military protection of Australian sea-borne trade against attacks by major or 
even middle powers would be immensely difficult and demanding, requiring 
forces quite unlike anything we now plan.  As a strategic objective this is 
simply not credible. 
A Stable, Rules-based Global Order 
Force 2030 strongly affirms the low priority that Defence 2000 gave to 
strategic interests beyond the Asian region as a driver of capability 
development.37  This is important in view of the arguments made by many in 
the years since 2000 that global commitments to support the United States 
should take first place in setting Australian strategic priorities.  Perhaps in 
reaction to this debate, Force 2030 if anything goes somewhat further than 
Defence 2000, and at times reads as if it is determined to present a distinctly 
different view of Australia’s alliance support for the United States at the 
global level from John Howard’s.38  It will be interesting to see whether this is 
more than mere political posturing.  Certainly the new Labor Government will 
not be following Robert Hill’s ideas by elevating support for the United States 
at the global level to the top of our strategic priorities.  But—the aberration of 
Iraq notwithstanding—neither did John Howard.  Nothing we have seen of 
the actual policy decisions made by the Rudd Government so far suggests 
that it will deviate much from the longstanding bipartisan approach to 
supporting the United States beyond the Asia-Pacific, which has shaped 
Australia’s responses to calls from the White House for three decades now.   
33 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, para. 2.2.
34 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 6.38. 
35 Kevin Rudd, Address to the RSL National Congress, Townsville, 9 September 2008. 
36 Department of Defence, Force 2030, para. 5.12, 7.14 and 7.18. 
37 Ibid., para. 5.17-5.21. 
38 Ibid., para. 6.15. 
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Conclusion
Force 2030 recognises that defining strategic interests and objectives in a 
clear and coherent way is an essential step in any rigorous process to 
setting capability priorities.  But it fails to provide such clear and coherent 
definition, because the account it provides is undermined both by conceptual 
muddles and by substantive strategic misjudgements.  Of course this does 
not matter very much if the White Paper is just going through the motions to 
justify the present force and existing plans for the future Balanced Force.  
But it matters a great deal if, on the threshold of major strategic changes, the 
White Paper sets out fundamentally to reconsider the kinds of armed forces 
we should have.  Perhaps in the end, the reason Force 2030 failed to 
provide an effective account of strategic interests and objectives is that it 
never quite worked out which of these it was trying to do.  
Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University and a Visiting 
Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.  His principle research interests are 
Australian strategic and defence policy, and the regional and global security issues that most 
directly affect Australia.  He was Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Department of Defence 
1995-2000, and principal author of the previous White Paper, Defence 2000.
hugh.white@anu.edu.au.
